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Policy analysis with potentially misspecified dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
faces two challenges: estimation of parameters that are relevant for policy trade-offs and treatment
of estimated deviations from the cross-equation restrictions. This paper develops and explores policy
analysis approaches that are either based on a generalized shock structure for the DSGE model or the
explicit modelling of deviations from cross-equation restrictions. Using post-1982 U.S. data we first
quantify the degree of misspecification in a state-of-the-art DSGE model and then document the performance
of different interest-rate feedback rules. We find that many of the policy prescriptions derived from
the benchmark DSGE model are robust to the various treatments of misspecifications considered in
this paper, but that quantitatively the cost of deviating from such prescriptions varies substantially.
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Following the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003), many central banks are building and estimating dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) models with nominal rigidities and using them for policy analysis. Despite the
success in improving the empirical performance of DSGE models, misspeciﬁcation remains
a concern, as documented in Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007, henceforth
DSSW). Some of the cross-equation restrictions imposed by these models remain at odds
with the data. This paper illustrates the diﬃculties involved in conducting policy analy-
sis with misspeciﬁed models. Two broad issues arise. First, how should the parameters
be estimated in the presence of misspeciﬁcation? Second, how should one treat empirical
deviations from model-implied cross-equation restrictions when conducting policy analysis?
In the literature and in the practice of central banks, there exist three diﬀerent ap-
proaches for dealing with misspeciﬁcation. One approach is to ignore the problem and
derive quantitative policy recommendations as if the DSGE model were correctly speciﬁed,
e.g., Laforte (2003) and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2006). A second approach
is to manipulate the shock structure of the DSGE model to optimize the ﬁt of the resulting
empirical speciﬁcation. Smets and Wouters (2003) use more shocks than observables to
obtain a DSGE model with a ﬁt to Euro area data comparable to that of a Bayesian VAR.
Smets and Wouters (2006) generalize the law of motion of some of the exogenous shocks in a
DSGE model for U.S. data in which the number of shocks equals the number of observables.
The tacit assumption underlying the policy analysis is that these shocks are policy invariant,
even if they partially reﬂect misspeciﬁcation.
A third approach is to model the deviations from the cross-equation restrictions explic-
itly in the likelihood. For instance, Ireland (2006), following Sargent (1989), assumes that
the observations based on which the DSGE model is estimated are subject to “measure-
ment” errors. While the measurement errors improve the empirical ﬁt, they raise serious
identiﬁcation problems – how can one distinguish measurement error dynamics from the dy-
namics in the underlying model-based variables - and tie the hands of the researcher in terms
of policy analysis: one has to assume that these measurement errors are policy-invariant.
Alternatively, Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) propose a method for incorporating devia-
tions from the VAR representation of the DSGE model, called DSGE-VAR. We will argue
in this paper that the DSGE-VAR framework is a versatile tool for policy analysis because
it allows us to make diﬀerent assumptions on how these deviations are aﬀected by policy2
changes. The framework thereby enables us to assess the robustness of the DSGE model’s
policy predictions in view of its empirical deﬁciencies.
We study how the aforementioned approaches deal with the issues described above,
inference and treatment of misspeciﬁcation. Starting point of our analysis is a state-of-the-
art New Keynesian DSGE model in which monetary policy follows an interest-rate feedback
rule. The goal is to assess how changes in the feedback rule aﬀect the volatility of output,
inﬂation, and interest rates. We generate three types of parameter estimates. First, we
combine the DSGE model likelihood function with a prior distribution for its parameters
and compute a posterior distribution as in Schorfheide (2000). Second, we include in our
analysis the generalization of the shock structure as a possible method of dealing with
misspeciﬁcation. The ﬁnal set of estimates is obtained using the DSGE-VAR approach.
That is, we approximate the DSGE model with a fourth-order vector autoregression (VAR)
and specify a prior distribution for the VAR parameters centered at the model-implied
cross-equation restrictions. The resulting estimates of the VAR coeﬃcients are implicitly
projected back onto the cross-equation restrictions to obtain a minimum-distance estimator
of the DSGE model parameters. While the direct estimator forces the DSGE model to
match all the observed ﬂuctuations, the DSGE-VAR estimator (and to some extent the
generalized shocks estimator) lets some of the ﬂuctuations be explained by deviations from
cross-equation restrictions. This can be appealing if misspeciﬁcation of the DSGE model’s
likelihood function is a concern.
While there is a substantive body of literature on how to estimate parameters of DSGE
models and how to conduct policy analysis under model uncertainty, our framework al-
lows a uniﬁed treatment of some the key issues. It also provides new methods to assess
the robustness of policy implications of a benchmark DSGE model in view of evidence of
misspeciﬁcation. The calibration literature initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1982) has
traditionally emphasized that it is more important to construct careful measurements of
the parameters that determine policy trade-oﬀs using informative data sources, than to ob-
tain a good time series ﬁt of the DSGE model. This sentiment is expressed, for instance,
in Kocherlakota (2006). Bayesian analysis allows us to incorporate additional information
not captured by the likelihood function through prior distributions. It turns out that the
DSGE-VAR analysis has the feature that the greater the evidence for model misspeciﬁca-
tion, the less weight is placed on the likelihood function to construct the estimates of the
DSGE model parameters.
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2002) estimate the parameters of their3
DSGE model by matching DSGE model impulse responses to monetary policy and tech-
nology shocks with those obtained from an identiﬁed VAR. While this impulse response
function matching makes parameter estimates more robust to some forms of model mis-
speciﬁcation, the resulting empirical speciﬁcation is not able to explain all the variation of
output, inﬂation, and interest rates that we observe in the data. Hence, policy analysis
with such a model would have to assume that the propagation of other unspeciﬁed shocks
is not altered by changes in the policy rule or that the eﬀects would mirror those of, say,
the eﬀects on the technology shock.
Indeed, the second major issue concerns the treatment of misspeciﬁcation in conducting
the policy exercise. Within the generalized-shocks framework we derive policy implication
under the standard assumption that the parameters of the shock processes are policy in-
variant. Within the DSGE-VAR framework we make diﬀerent assumptions about the policy
invariance of the estimated deviations from the model-implied cross-equation restrictions.
These assumptions include treating the DSGE-VAR as a backward-looking structural VAR,
thereby ignoring eﬀects of policy changes on expectation formation; treating discrepancies
in terms of moving average representations as policy invariant; evaluating policies under a
priori beliefs about misspeciﬁcation.1
Empirical evidence can help us discriminating between the diﬀerent approaches to policy
analysis. We ﬁnd strong evidence of DSGE model misspeciﬁcation. This misspeciﬁcation
aﬀects the estimates of key non-policy parameters – and speciﬁcally the persistence of tech-
nology shocks – which diﬀer between the DSGE model, the generalized shocks approach, and
the DSGE-VAR. This diﬀerence drives much of the policy results. We also ﬁnd that misspec-
iﬁcation is not at all severe in the dimension that is most important for policy, the responses
to technology shocks. This evidence casts doubt on the polar approaches of ignoring the
cross-equation restriction completely and treating the DSGE-VAR as a backward-looking
model. Two lessons are robust across all modes of policy analysis considered in this paper.
First, deviating from the baseline parameters of the feedback rule is unlikely to provide
substantial improvements over the estimated Volcker-Greenspan policy. Second it appears
undesirable to decrease the response to inﬂation, or to increase the reaction to deviations
of output from a long-run trend path. Quantitatively, the cost of deviating from these
prescriptions varies substantially across approaches.
1Preliminary empirical results for some of the DSGE-VAR analysis based on a simple three-equation
New Keynesian model without capital and wage rigidity were reported in the 2005 Proceedings Volume of
the Journal of the European Economic Association, Del Negro and Schorfheide (2005).4
There is a long-standing recognition that model uncertainty is an important aspect of
the assessment of monetary policies, e.g., Brainard (1967), Chow (1975), and Craine (1979).
A natural approach in the presence of model uncertainty is to evaluate policy rules within
all the model speciﬁcations that are under consideration, either following a Bayesian route
or a minimax strategy. The literature contains numerous applications of these ideas, e.g.,
McCallum (1988), Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), Rudebusch (2001, 2002),
Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski and Williams (2003), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004),
Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Hansen and Sargent (2005). All these papers diﬀer with
regard to the type of models included in the model set, and the formulation of the decision
problem that leads to the choice of a preferred policy.
Our model set is purposefully smaller than that considered in recent papers that study
the performance of diﬀerent interest-rate feedback rules across a variety of econometric
models, including models that are currently used by the Board of Governors and the Euro-
pean Central Bank, e.g., Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), Taylor (1999), Coenen
(2003), Levin and Williams (2003), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004), and Adalid, Coenen,
McAdam, and Siviero (2005).2 The benchmark DSGE model is at the center of our analy-
sis. We surround this benchmark model with (i) DSGE models with a more general shock
structure, and (ii) structural VARs that allow for deviations from the cross-equation re-
strictions to improve the empirical ﬁt. We view our framework as a diagnostic tool. If our
likelihood-based measure of ﬁt point toward misspeciﬁcation, we provide tools to parame-
terize the discrepancies between theory and data, and assess the robustness of the DSGE
model’s policy implications under diﬀerent assumptions about the policy invariance of the
discrepancies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric framework. The
DSGE model is presented in Section 3. This model is based on work by Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Linde (2002), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005). Compared to the benchmark New Keynesian models discussed, for
instance, in Woodford (2003), our model has been subjected to a number of modiﬁcations,
all designed to improve its empirical ﬁt. Section 4 describes the data set and discusses our
empirical ﬁndings, and Section 5 concludes. Detailed analytical derivations, a description
of the Markov-Chain-Monte Carlo methods used to implement the Bayesian computations,
and the precise speciﬁcation of the prior distribution for the DSGE model parameters are
2With the exception of Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004) little or no attention is paid to ﬁt and forecasting
performance when weighting predictions from various models.5
provided in a Technical Appendix that is available from the authors upon request.
2 Setup and Inference
This section describes our analytical framework for monetary policy analysis under potential
misspeciﬁcation. The goal of the analysis is to study the eﬀects of changing coeﬃcients in
an interest rate feedback rule such as
Rt = ψ1πt + ψ2e yt + σR1,t (1)
on the variability of some key macroeconomic variables. Here Rt is the nominal interest
rate, πt is the inﬂation rate, ˜ yt are output deviations from a smooth trend, which we refer
to as output gap, and 1,t is a monetary policy shock with unit variance. We make the
simplifying assumption that the public believes the new policy to be in place indeﬁnitely
after being announced credibly.
Starting point for the analysis is a DSGE model that describes the optimal behavior
of households and ﬁrms and determines an equilibrium law of motion for the macroeco-
nomic variables of interest. The following two equations provide a simple version of a New
Keynesian DSGE model
e yt − gt = I Et[e yt+1 − gt+1] − (Rt − I Et[πt+1]), (2)
πt = βI Et[πt+1] + κ(e yt − zt − gt), (3)
which we use in this section for the sake of exposition. Equation (2) is obtained from the
consumption Euler equation, (3) is derived from the optimal price setting of monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms and typically referred to as New Keynesian Phillips curve. To complete
the model speciﬁcation one needs to specify a law of motion for the exogenous processes gt
(government spending) and zt (technology), such as:
gt = ρggt−1 + σgg,t, zt = ρzzt−1 + σzz,t, (4)
where the innovations g,t and z,t are identically and independently distributed standard
normal random variates.
We proceed by grouping the parameters into two categories: θ(p) = [ψ1,ψ2,σR]0 is
the vector of parameters that describe central bank behavior and the elements of θ(np) =
[β,κ,ρg,ρz,σg,σz]0 characterize preferences and technologies as well as the law of motion of
the exogenous processes. We let θ = [θ0
(p),θ0
(np)]0, y1,t = Rt, and y2,t = [e yt,πt]. Equations (1)6
to (4) characterize a linear rational expectations system. Its solution leads to a moving-







j embody the cross-equation restrictions imposed by the DSGE model.
With (1) and (5) in hand it is straightforward to compute the covariance matrix for in-
terest rates, output, and inﬂation V∗(θ(p),θ(np)) as well as weighted averages of variances
tr[WV∗(θ(p),θ(np))] that can serve as performance measures for monetary policy. Here tr[·]
denotes the trace operator and W is a symmetric positive deﬁnite weight matrix.
In the absence of misspeciﬁcation policy analysis is straightforward. Suppose we adopt
a Bayesian framework and start from a prior distribution with density p(θ(p),θ(np)) for
the DSGE model parameters. We then combine the prior with the likelihood function
p(Y |θ(p),θ(np)) of the DSGE model to obtain a posterior distribution with density p(θ(p),θ(np)|Y ).
The calculations can be implemented with the methods described in An and Schorfheide



























where p(θ(np)|Y ) is the marginal posterior density of the non-policy parameters.
Unfortunately, much of the empirical evidence points towards misspeciﬁcation of the
restricted moving average terms D∗
j(θ(p),θ(np)) in (5). As an alternative to (5) we consider










Using a modiﬁed version of the DSGE-VAR framework developed in Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2004) and DSSW we ﬁrst re-conﬁrm the empirical evidence that D∆
j is not zero. Once model
misspeciﬁcation has been detected two challenges arise: (i) How does the presence of mis-
speciﬁcation aﬀect the estimate of the non-policy parameters θ(np)? This is an important
question because some of these parameters (e.g., the degree of nominal rigidities, or the
persistence of shocks) play a key role in the policy analysis. (ii) How do policy changes of
θ(p) translate into changes in D∆
j ? In turn we will discuss two approaches to address these
challenges.
The ﬁrst approach is described in Section 2.1 and builds upon the DSGE-VAR frame-
work. We solve the DSGE model, then create a prior distribution for a VAR that concen-7
trates in the neighborhood of the DSGE model implied restrictions yet allows for deviations.3
We construct a joint posterior distribution for VAR and DSGE model parameters. The VAR
likelihood function is penalized by the prior distribution if its parameters strongly deviate
from the DSGE model-implied restrictions. Simultaneously, the DSGE model parameters θ
are essentially estimated by minimizing the deviations D∆
j from the cross-equation restric-
tions D∗
j(θ(p),θ(np)). The DSGE model is treated as a reference model around which the
more loosely parameterized VAR is centered. We will subsequently provide reasons why the
estimates of θ(np) obtained under the DSGE-VAR, rather than those obtained under the
DSGE model, might be preferable for policy analysis.
Once we have obtained estimates of the VAR and the DSGE dynamics we consider four
methods of conducting a policy analysis that diﬀer with respect to the assumptions about the
policy-invariance of private agents’ behavior and the discrepancies D∆
j : (i) One extreme is
to perform the policy exercise under the DSGE model. In this case the DSGE-VAR is only a
tool to provide alternative estimates of θ(np). (ii) The other extreme is to ignore the rational
expectations responses of the private sector behavior. That is, one treats the DSGE-VAR
as a structural (backward looking) VAR and only changes the coeﬃcients of the monetary
policy rule. The third and forth approach lie in between these two polar cases. Under (iii)
we use D∗
j(θ(p),θ(np)) but acknowledge the presence of misspeciﬁcation. We regard historical
estimates of the discrepancy matrices as largely uninformative about the post-intervention
misspeciﬁcation. Performance measures are computed from (7) under the prior instead of
posterior distribution of the D∆
j ’s. Finally, method (iv) uses the posterior of the D∆
j ’s and
treats the discrepancies as policy invariant. We discuss under what circumstances each of
these methods can be appealing.
A second approach to cope with model misspeciﬁcation is discussed in Section 2.2 and
reﬁnes a common practice in the empirical work with DSGE models. This practice amounts
to relaxing the restrictions placed on the law of motion of the exogenous shocks in (4) by
introducing additional shocks into the model and/or by generalizing the AR(1) structure.
The modiﬁcation of the shock structure introduces additional parameters that have to be
estimated along with θ(p) and θ(np). Although macroeconomists understand that these
additional parameters in most cases do not capture micro-founded propagation mechanisms,
they are nonetheless often introduced to ameliorate misspeciﬁcation problems. Once these
3Unlike in our earlier work which applies this prior to the law of motion of both Rt and y2,t, we use
this prior distribution only for the equations that describe the evolution of y2,t. These equations are then
combined with the monetary policy rule.8
parameters have been estimated, it is common practice to treat them as “structural,” i.e.
policy invariant and to conduct policy analysis by calculating rational expectations solutions
of the DSGE model under the modiﬁed shock structure.4
2.1 Relaxing Restrictions on the Reduced Form
We begin by modifying the DSGE-VAR framework to obtain estimates of the extent to which
the DSGE model implied restrictions are violated. Rather than working with inﬁnite-order
moving-average representations along the lines of Equation (7), the DSGE-VAR uses ﬁnite-
order VAR representations since they are easier to handle at the model estimation step. We
then explain how θ(np) and D∆
j are identiﬁed.
2.1.1 The DSGE-VAR Framework




2,tβ2(θ) + 1,tσR, (8)
where yt = [y1,t,y0
2,t]0 and the k × 1 vector xt = [y0
t−1,...,y0
t−p,1]0 is composed of the ﬁrst
p lags of yt and an intercept. The vector-valued functions β1(θ) and β2(θ) interact with xt
and y2,t to generate the policy rule. In our simple example β1(θ) = 0 and β2(θ) extracts
inﬂation and output from the vector y2,t and multiplies it by the policy rule coeﬃcients ψ1
and ψ2. Our notation is general enough to cover the more elaborate monetary policy rules
used in the empirical analysis.5
We proceed by approximating the DSGE model-implied moving average representa-





Assuming that under the DSGE model the law of motion for y2,t is covariance stationary
for every θ, we deﬁne the moment matrices ΓXX(θ) = I E
D
θ [xtx0




4A related approach to misspeciﬁcation amounts to introducing ad-hoc features into the model. Given
that these features are model speciﬁc, we do not deal explicitly with them in our framework. One can see
however that this related approach is in many ways germane to relaxing the shock structure.
5Considering forecast-based policy rules in this framework would require signiﬁcant modiﬁcations. How-
ever, according to the ﬁndings reported by Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) forecast-based rules do not
provide substantial gains in stabilization performance compared with simple outcome-based rules. Hence,
we decided not to pursue these modiﬁcations at this point.9
In our notation I E
D
θ [·] denotes an expectation taken under the probability distribution for
yt and xt generated by the DSGE model conditional on the parameter vector θ. We deﬁne












Σ∗(θ) = ΓY Y (θ) − ΓY X(θ)Γ
−1
XX(θ)ΓXY (θ). (12)
If we assume that the ut’s are normally distributed, denoted by ut ∼ N(0,Σ∗(θ)), then
Equations (9) to (12) deﬁne a restricted VAR(p) for the vector yt. While the moving-
average representation of yt under the linearized DSGE model does in general not have
an exact VAR representation, the restriction functions Ψ∗(θ) and Σ∗(θ) are deﬁned such
that the covariance matrix of yt, which enters the construction of our policy performance
measure (6), is preserved. Let I E
V AR
Ψ,Σ [·] denote expectations under the restricted VAR. It








This point is important given that the second moments of the endogenous variables are the
objects of interest for this analysis.
To account for potential misspeciﬁcation we now relax the DSGE model restrictions and














and ut ∼ N(0,Σ∗(θ) + Σ∆). Our analysis is cast in a Bayesian framework in which initial
beliefs about the DSGE model parameter θ and the model misspeciﬁcation matrices Ψ∆
and Σ∆ are summarized in a prior distribution. In contrast to Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2004) and DSSW, we assume in (14) that there is no misspeciﬁcation in the policy rule.



















where IW denotes the inverted Wishart distribution, B1(θ) = [β1(θ),0k×(n−1)], and B2(θ) =
[β2(θ),I(n−1)×(n−1)].
A few remarks on the shape of the prior contours for Ψ∆,Σ∆, and how the prior dis-
tributes mass along these contours are in order. First, the distribution of mass is controlled
by the hyperparameter T∗, which we will re-parameterize in terms of multiples of the ac-
tual sample size T, that is T∗ = λT. Large values of λ imply that large discrepancies are
unlikely to occur and the prior concentrates near the restriction functions Ψ∗(θ) and Σ∗(θ).
We consider values of λ on a ﬁnite grid Λ and use a data-driven procedure to determine
an appropriate value for this hyperparameter. A natural criterion to select λ in a Bayesian




Here pλ(Ψ,Σ,θ) is a joint prior distribution for the VAR coeﬃcient matrices Ψ = Ψ∗(θ)+Ψ∆
and Σ = Σ∗(θ)+Σ∆ and the DSGE model parameters θ. This prior is obtained by combining
the prior in (15) with a prior density for θ, denoted by p(θ):
pλ(Ψ,Σ,θ) = p(θ)pλ(Σ|θ)pλ(Φ|Σ,θ). (17)
We deﬁne
ˆ λ = argmaxλ∈Λ pλ(Y ). (18)
As discussed in DSSW, ˆ λ and the marginal likelihood ratio pλ=ˆ λ(Y )/pλ=∞(Y ) provide an
overall measure of ﬁt for the DSGE model. If there is a large discrepancy between the
autocovariances implied by the DSGE model and the sample autocovariances, ˆ λ will be
small and the marginal likelihood ratio will be large.
Second, the size of the model misspeciﬁcation is associated with the ease with which it
can be detected via likelihood ratios, in the spirit of Hansen and Sargent’s (2005) robust con-
trol approach, as discussed in detail in DSSW. Third, holding the innovation matrix Σ∗(θ)
constant, ΓXX(θ) tends to be large – hence the prior variance of Ψ∆ small – whenever θ
implies that the endogenous variables are highly persistent. We view this as an attractive
feature of the prior. Since due to the presence of transversality conditions DSGE model so-
lutions are restricted to be stationary, our prior steers us away from VAR parameterizations
that imply non-stationarity and explosiveness. Finally, our prior is also computationally
convenient. We use Markov-Chain-Monte Carlo methods described in the Technical Ap-
pendix to generate draws from the joint posterior distribution of Ψ, Σ, and θ as well as
to evaluate the marginal data density pλ(Y ). We refer to empirical model comprised of11
the likelihood function associated with the restricted VAR in Equation (14) and the prior
distributions pλ(Ψ,Σ|Y ), given in (15), and p(θ) as DSGE-VAR(λ).
2.1.2 Parameter Estimation
This subsection provides some intuition for how the parameters of the DSGE model are
estimated under the DSGE-VAR procedure. To simplify the exposition, we will condition on
the covariance matrix Σ and the hyperparameter λ that controls the magnitude of deviations
from the DSGE model restrictions. Conforming with the partitioning of ut into u1,t and u2,t,
we partition the covariance matrix into the sub-matrices Σ11, Σ12, Σ21, and Σ22. Moreover,
we deﬁne Σ11.22 = Σ11 − Σ12Σ
−1

























2(Ψ − Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)))0ΓXX(Ψ − Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)))

×p(θ(p),θ(np))




We can draw several conclusions from the form of the posterior density. First, the
policy parameters are essentially identiﬁed via exclusion restrictions. The functions β1(·)
and β2(·) only depend on the policy parameters, the only DSGE model parameters that
enter the monetary policy rule. Conditional on Ψ most of the information about the policy
parameters stems from the contribution of Y1 to the likelihood function (lines 2 and 3 in (19))
as well as the prior p(θ(p),θ(np)). The term (Y2 − XΨ)Σ
−1
22 Σ12 corrects for the endogeneity
of the contemporaneous regressors in the policy rule. Identiﬁcation is achieved through
an exclusion restriction embodied in β2(·). In the above example no lagged endogenous
variables enter the policy rule (1). In the empirical application we assume that only lagged
interest rates enter the policy rule in addition to contemporaneous measures of inﬂation
and output. These exclusion restrictions are consistent with the speciﬁcation of the DSGE
model and identify the monetary policy shock 1,t in the DSGE-VAR.12
Second, we discuss the estimation of the non-policy parameters. The value of λ –
the extent to which we admit the presence of misspeciﬁcation – plays an important role
here. Conditional on Ψ, the shape of the posterior of θ(np) is determined by p(Ψ|θ(p),θ(np))
(line 4 in (19)) and the prior p(θ(p),θ(np)). If the hyperparameter λ is small, the latter will
dominate. For large values of λ the estimate of θ(np) has the ﬂavor of a minimum distance
estimate and is identiﬁed provided that diﬀerent values of θ(np) imply diﬀerent values for
Ψ∗(·) (see Smith 1993). The posterior density is high for values of θ(np) that imply a
small discrepancy between Ψ and the restriction function Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)). In summary, if
we assume there is no misspeciﬁcation (λ = ∞), we force the θ(np) to generate all the
dynamics observed in the data. As we lower λ, we relax this constraint and let our prior
density p(θ(p),θ(np)) play a more important role in the formation of the posterior. Given
that current macroeconomic practice puts emphasis on the prior information obtained from
– say – microeconomic evidence (for example, on the degree of price stickiness), this reliance
on the prior can be appealing.
Third, conditional on θ(p) and θ(np), the shape of the posterior for Ψ is mostly determined
by the contribution of Y2 to the likelihood function (line 1 in (19)). The prior density
p(Ψ|θ(p),θ(s)) serves as a penalty function, that penalizes values of Ψ that deviate strongly
from the restriction function Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)). In fact, we show in a slightly diﬀerent setup
in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) that the VAR is estimated subject to the restriction
Ψ = Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)), if λ = ∞.
2.1.3 Policy Analysis
The challenge in the evaluation of monetary policy rules is to predict the private sector’s
behavioral responses to policy regime changes, which are captured by the coeﬃcient matrix
Ψ and the elements of Σ that are unrelated to the monetary policy shock. We will describe
four types of analysis that diﬀer according to the assumptions that are being made about
the policy-invariance of private agents’ behavior and model misspeciﬁcation.
Forward-looking Analysis: One can decide to use the DSGE-VAR framework only to
obtain estimates of θ(np) that in the presence of misspeciﬁcation do not force the DSGE
model to capture all the dynamics in the data. Conditional on these parameter estimates,
the policy analysis is conducted directly with the DSGE model.
Backward-looking Analysis: At the other extreme, one can choose to conduct the exer-
cise using DSGE-VAR as a structural VAR, as for instance in Sims (1999). This amounts13
to assuming that the decision rules of ﬁrms and households are unaﬀected by the policy
change. The DSGE-VAR developed previously can be interpreted as a structural VAR in









According to the underlying DSGE model, u2,t is a function of the monetary policy shock
1,t and other structural shocks 2,t. We assume that the shocks 2,t have unit variance and
are uncorrelated with each other and the monetary policy shock. We express u2,t as
u0
2,t = 1,tA1 + 0
2,tA2. (20)




















While this decomposition of the forecast error covariance matrix identiﬁes A1, it does not
uniquely determine the matrix A2. Let A2,tr be a Cholesky factor of A0
2A2 and ˜ u2,t be
a vector of innovations with mean zero and unit variance, that is uncorrelated with the
monetary policy shock 1,t. Following Sims (1986), we express the private sector equations
as follows:
y0
2,t(I + β2A1) − y1,tA1 = x0
t(Ψ − β1A1) + ˜ u0
2,tA2,tr. (23)
In the backward-looking analysis we use posterior draws of (θ,Ψ,Σ) to determine β1, β2, A1,
and A2,tr and assume that the coeﬃcients in (23) are policy-invariant. The counterfactual
law of motion of yt under a new policy ˜ θ(p) is obtained from
y1,t − y0
2,tβ2(˜ θ(p)) = x0
tβ1(˜ θ(p)) + 1,tσR (24)
y0
2,t(I + β2A1) − y1,tA1 = x0
t(Ψ − β1A1) + ˜ u0
2,tA2,tr.
The ﬁrst equation represents the new monetary policy rule, whereas the second equation
captures the (unchanged) law of motion for the private-sector variables.
Acknowledge Misspeciﬁcation We use the historical sample to estimate the non-policy
parameters θ(np) and the overall degree of misspeciﬁcation measured by ˆ λ. Starting from
the forward-looking analysis we do acknowledge misspeciﬁcation and hence introduce the14
matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆ into the policy analysis step. The DSGE-VAR framework is used to
predict policy outcomes:
y1,t = x0
tβ1(˜ θ(p)) + x0
t
 
Ψ∗(˜ θ(p),θ(np)) + Ψ∆





Ψ∗(˜ θ(p),θ(np)) + Ψ∆
+ u0
2,t,
where the covariance matrix of ut is given by Σ∗(˜ θ(p),θ(np)) + Σ∆. In the absence of a
ﬁrm theory that explains how the discrepancy matrices respond to policy changes, we use
the prior distribution (15) to characterize beliefs about post-intervention model misspeci-
ﬁcation. This analysis reﬂects the belief that the sample, and hence the posterior of Ψ∆
and Σ∆ provides no information misspeciﬁcation after a new policy has been implemented.
This scepticism about the relevance of sample information is shared by the robust control
approaches of Giannoni (2002), Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski and Williams (2003),
and Hansen and Sargent (2005). However, instead of using a minimax calculation we rely
on a prior probability distribution p(Ψ∆,Σ∆|θ,λ) to cope with misspeciﬁcation uncertainty.
Policy-Invariant Misspeciﬁcation To characterize the degree of misspeciﬁcation in an es-
timated DSGE model, DSSW compare impulse response functions from the DSGE-VAR(ˆ λ)
to those from a DSGE-VAR(∞). If the DSGE model is well speciﬁed, ˆ λ is likely to be
large and the discrepancy among the impulse response functions is small. If on the other
hand, the misspeciﬁcation is substantial and ˆ λ is small, then the discrepancy between the
impulse response functions can be used to diagnose in which dimension the DSGE model
is misspeciﬁed. We will now assume that the estimated discrepancy, in terms of impulse
response functions, is policy invariant.
For the impulse response functions to be interpretable, it is useful to apply an identi-
ﬁcation scheme that links them to the structural shocks in the underlying DSGE model.
Recall that the monetary policy shock has been identiﬁed through an exclusion restriction.
However, we still have to identify the matrix A2 in (20). We follow the approach taken
in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004). Let A0
2,trA2,tr = A0
2A2 be the Cholesky decomposi-
tion of A0
2A2. The relationship between A2,tr and A2 is given by A0
2 = A0
2,trΩ, where Ω is
an orthonormal matrix that is not identiﬁable based on the estimates of β(θ), Ψ, and Σ.
However, we are able to calculate an initial eﬀect of 2,t on y2,t based on the DSGE model,
denoted by AD
2 (θ). This matrix can be uniquely decomposed into a lower triangular matrix
and an orthonormal matrix:
AD
0
2 (θ) = AD
0
2,tr(θ)Ω∗(θ). (26)15
To identify A2 above, we combine A0
2,tr with Ω∗(θ).6 Loosely speaking, the rotation matrix
is constructed such that in the absence of misspeciﬁcation the DSGE model’s and the DSGE-
VAR’s impulse responses to 2,t coincide. To the extent that misspeciﬁcation is mainly in the
dynamics as opposed to the covariance matrix of innovations, the identiﬁcation procedure
can be interpreted as matching, at least qualitatively, the short-run responses of the VAR
with those from the DSGE model.
In order to implement the policy analysis, we use posterior draws of (θ,Ψ,Σ) to create
























The ﬁrst representation is calculated from the VAR approximation of the DSGE model
Ψ∗(θ) and Σ∗(θ). The second representation is obtained from the estimated DSGE-VAR
speciﬁcation. The impulse response function discrepancies (DSGE-VAR(ˆ λ) versus DSGE-
VAR(∞)) are given by
IRF∆





























If we were endowed with with a credible model of how Ψ∆ and Σ∆ vary with policy, we
should of course use such model, and the DSGE-VAR analysis would lose its appeal. In the
absence of such a model our forward-looking analysis, the backward-looking analysis, and the
policy-invariant misspeciﬁcation analysis take diﬀerent attitudes toward the Lucas critique
in that they assume that certain coeﬃcients in the empirical model are policy invariant.
The acknowledge-misspeciﬁcation analysis is more agnostic in that it places a probability
distribution over the post-intervention misspeciﬁcation matrices.
2.2 Relaxing Restrictions on the Exogenous Shocks
Equation (4) in our example restricts the exogenous shocks to follow AR(1) processes that
are uncorrelated with each other at all leads and lags. While this assumption is common
6The calculation is easily implementable in a MCMC analysis. For every draw of (θ,Ψ∆,Σ∆) from their
joint posterior distribution we compute Ω∗(θ) and A2.16
in the literature on estimated DSGE models, it is also arbitrary. For instance, there is
no theory that implies that technology shocks have to follow AR(1) processes. In general,
the literature strives to build models in which persistence and co-movements are generate
endogenously, through some economic mechanism, rather than exogenously. This pursuit
favors speciﬁcation in which shocks are indeed uncorrelated with each other and have fairly
simple dynamics. However, once taken to the data, these speciﬁcations often miss important
aspects, which has lead researchers to consider more general shock processes.
The generalization of the exogenous shocks takes in most cases the form of additional
AR(1) processes. For instance, Smets and Wouters (2003) ﬁt a model with 10 exogenous
shocks to seven macroeconomic variables. Several of these shocks have been added in the
model building process to overcome speciﬁcation problems. More recently, a number of
authors including Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and Primiceri, Schaumburg, and
Tambalotti (2006) have studied the extent to which intra- and intertemporal optimality
conditions implied by DSGE models are consistent with the data. If they are not, the
resulting “wedges” are represented by stochastic shocks, underlining that the proliferation
of exogenous shocks in empirical DSGE models can be thought of as an attempt to overcome
speciﬁcation problems. Alternatively, Smets and Wouters (2006) are using ARMA(1,1)
processes to describe the law of motion of price and wage mark-up shocks in their DSGE
model. We show that this approach is simply another ways of allowing for deviations
D∆
j from the cross-equation restrictions D∗
j(θ(p),θ(np)) in (7). Unlike in the DSGE-VAR
framework, these deviations are introduced in the structural form rather than the reduced
form. But when it comes to policy analysis, this approach shares the same conceptual
diﬃculties as the DSGE-VAR: One needs to assume that the D∆
j ’s are policy invariant.









































(x)]0, where θ(s) =
[β,κ]0, θ∗
(x) = [ρg,ρz,σg,σz]0, and θ∆

















Hence, this approach generates a representation for the discrepancy matrices D∆
j in (7), and
links them to the policy parameters θ(p) under the assumption that θ∆
(x) is policy invariant.
2.2.1 Implementation
As in Section 2.1 it is more convenient to work with vector autoregressive representations
when implementing the analysis in practice. In the context of our example we stack the
exogenous processes in the vector e zt = [gt,zt]0 and consider a general representation of the
form
e zt = Φ1e zt−1 + ... + Φpe zt−1 + e t. (30)
The innovations e t are not normalized and have a covariance matrix Σ. Let x0






tΦ + e 0
t. (31)












(x)). Then let Φ = Φ∗(θ∗
(x))+Φ∆, and Σ = Σ∗
(θ∗
(x))+Σ∆































The intuition for this prior is very simple. Suppose we are generating a prior for an AR(2)
model from an AR(1). Given the parameters of the AR(1) (θ∗
(x)) we can generate artiﬁcial
observations from an AR(1) model. The expected moments of these observations are summa-
rized in the matrices ΓZZ(θ∗
(x)), ΓXX(θ∗
(x)), and ΓXZ(θ∗
(x)) and serve as suﬃcient statistics
for the estimation of the parameters of the AR(2) model. The posterior distribution from
this (ﬁctional) estimation is given by (32).
Under the generalized shocks, the DSGE model in our example would consist of Equa-
tions (1) to (3) and (30). The parameter vector is composed of θ(p), θ(s), Φ, and Σ.
Equation (32) generates a prior distribution for Φ and Σ conditional on θ∗
(x), which can be
combined with a prior on the hyperparameters θ∗
(x) as in (17). Thus, the joint distribution





Under the generalized shock structure the law of motion for the exogenous processes is
parameterized in terms of Φ and Σ instead of just θ∗
(x). Nevertheless, we can estimate the
DSGE model with standard Bayesian methods. However, the less restrictive the speciﬁcation
for the exogenous shock processes, the more diﬃcult it becomes to disentangle the taste-and-
technology parameters θ(s) from the parameters that determine the evolution of e zt. From
an econometric perspective, the likelihood function may ﬂatten as we generalize the shock
structure. It is well known that in a Bayesian framework, prior distributions will not be
updated along directions in the parameter space in which the likelihood function is ﬂat (see
Poirier, 1998).
2.2.3 Policy Analysis
If one is willing to assume that the generalized shocks are structural, in the sense that they











can be calculated by solving the DSGE model under the generalized shock structure for




(p). However, to the extent that the lag polynomial
P∞
j=0 C∆
j Lj has essentially been added to compensate for model misspeciﬁcation, its policy
invariance is not self-evident.
3 Model
For the empirical analysis we will use a model that is more sophisticated than the one used
in Section 2. In addition to responding to inﬂation and output, the central bank also engages
in interest rate smoothing:
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1 − ρR)(ψ1πt + ψ2e yt) + σR1,t. (33)
As before, Rt and πt are the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate, respectively.
The output gap e yt represents output deviations from a smooth trend path. This notion
is broadly consistent with the measure of potential output calculated by the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce (CBO) and used historically in monetary policy making. While much of the
theoretical literature deﬁnes potential output as the level of output that would prevail in19
the absence of nominal rigidities, we want (33) to closely resemble the speciﬁcations in the
empirical literature on interest rate feedback rules (e.g. Taylor, 1993).
The remainder of the model is based on work by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003) and is identical to the speciﬁcation in DSSW with
one exception. Since e yt captures deviation from a long-run trend path we model technology
shocks as a stationary process rather than a unit-root process. For brevity we only present
the log-linearized equilibrium conditions and refer the reader to the above referenced papers
for the derivation of these conditions from assumptions on preferences and technologies. All
variables that appear subsequently are expressed as log-deviations from the steady state.
The economy is populated by a continuum of ﬁrms that combine capital and labor
to produce diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. These ﬁrms have access to the same Cobb-
Douglas production function with capital elasticity α and total factor productivity zt. The
intermediate goods producers hire labor and rent capital in competitive markets and hence
face identical real wages, wt, and rental rates for capital, rk
t . Cost minimization implies that
all ﬁrms produce with the same capital-labor ratio
kt − Lt = wt − rk
t (34)
and have marginal costs
mct = (1 − α)wt + αrk
t − (1 − α)zt. (35)
The intermediate goods producers sell their output to perfectly competitive ﬁnal good
producers, which aggregate the inputs according to a CES function. Proﬁt maximization of
the ﬁnal good producers implies that







(pt(j) − pt). (36)
Here e yt(j)−e yt and pt(j)−pt are quantity and price for good j relative to quantity and price
of the ﬁnal good. The price pt of the ﬁnal good is determined from a zero-proﬁt condition
for the ﬁnal good producers.
We assume that the price elasticity of the intermediate goods is time-varying. Since
this price elasticity aﬀects the mark-up that intermediate goods producers can charge over
marginal costs, we refer to λf,t as mark-up shock. Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in
every period a fraction of the intermediate goods producers ζp is unable to re-optimize their
prices. These ﬁrms adjust their prices mechanically according to the steady state inﬂation20
π∗.7 All other ﬁrms choose prices to maximize the expected discounted sum of future
proﬁts, which leads to the following equilibrium relationship, known as New Keynesian
Phillips curve:
πt = βI Et[πt+1] +






where β is the discount rate.8 Our assumption on the behavior of ﬁrms that are unable
to re-optimize their prices implies the absence of price dispersion in the steady state. As a
consequence, we obtain a log-linearized aggregate production function of the form
e yt = (1 − α)Lt + αkt + (1 − α)zt. (38)
Equations (35), (34), and (38) imply that the labor share lsht equals marginal costs in terms
of log-deviations: lsht = mct.
There is a continuum of households with identical preferences, which are separable in
consumption, leisure, and real money balances. Households’ preferences display (internal)
habit formation in consumption, that is, period t utility is a function of ln(Ct − hCt−1).
Households supply monopolistically diﬀerentiated labor services. These services are ag-
gregated according to a CES function that leads to a demand elasticity 1 + 1/λw (see
Equation (36)). The composite labor services are then supplied to the intermediate goods
producers at real wage wt. To introduce nominal wage rigidity, we assume that in each
period a fraction ζw of households is unable to re-optimize their wages. These households
adjust their t−1 nominal wage by π∗eγ, where γ represents the average growth rate of the



































where ˜ wt is the optimal real wage relative to the real wage for aggregate labor services,
wt, and νl would be the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity in a model without wage
7An alternative assumption is what Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) refer to as “dynamic indexation,”
where these ﬁrms’ prices grow at the previous period’s inﬂation. In Del Negro and Schorfheide (2006), we
discuss the extent to which a model with dynamic indexation is roughly observationally equivalent to one
with autocorrelated mark-up shock, using a similar framework and the same set of observables. Of the two
alternatives, here we use the one with autocorrelated mark-up shocks. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to investigate the implications of this choice for policy questions.
8We used the following re-parameterization: λf,t = (1 − ζpβ)(1 − ζp)λf/(1 + λf)e λf,t.21
rigidity (ζw = 0) and diﬀerentiated labor. Moreover, φt is a preference shock that aﬀects
the intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure and bt is a discount rate
shock that shifts the intertemporal substitution. The real wage paid by intermediate goods
producers evolves according to




Households are able to insure the idiosyncratic wage adjustment shocks with state con-
tingent claims. As a consequence they all share the same marginal utility of consumption
ξt, which is given by the expression:
(eγ − hβ)(eγ − h)ξt = −(e2γ + βh2)ct + βheγI Et[ct+1] + heγct−1 (41)
+(e2γ + βh2)bt − βhe−γ(e2γ + βh2)I Et[bt+1],
where ct is consumption. In addition to state-contingent claims households accumulate
three types of assets: one-period nominal bonds that yield the return Rt, capital ¯ kt, and
real money balances. Since preferences for real money balances are assumed to be additively
separable and monetary policy is conducted through a nominal interest rate feedback rule,
money is block exogenous and we will not use the households’ money demand equation in
our empirical analysis.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to bond holdings delivers the standard Euler
equation:
ξt = I Et[ξt+1] + Rt − I Et[πt+1]. (42)
Capital accumulates according to the following law of motion:
¯ kt = (2 − eγ − δ)¯ kt−1 + (eγ + δ − 1)

it + S00e2γ(1 + β)µt

, (43)
where it is investment, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, and µt is a stochastic disturbance
to the price of installed capital relative to consumption. Investment in our model is subject
to adjustment costs, and S00 denotes the second derivative of the investment adjustment cost









(1 + β)S00e2γ (ξk
t − ξt) + µt, (44)
where ξk
t is the value of installed capital and evolves according to:
ξk







(1 − (1 − δ)βe−γ)rk
t+1 − (Rt − πt+1)

. (45)22
Capital utilization ut in our model is variable and rk
t in the previous equation represents
the rental rate of eﬀective capital kt, which is given by
kt = ut + ¯ kt−1. (46)






Here a0 is the derivative of the per-unit-of-capital cost function a(ut) evaluated at the steady
state utilization rate.
The aggregate resource constraint is given by:















Here c∗/y∗ and i∗/y∗ are the steady state consumption-output and investment-output ratios,
respectively, and g∗/(1+g∗) corresponds to the government share of aggregate output. The
process gt can be interpreted as exogenous government spending shock. It is assumed that
ﬁscal policy is passive in the sense that the government uses lump-sum taxes to satisfy its
period budget constraint. In addition to the monetary policy shock 1,t the DSGE model has
six exogenous shocks zt, gt, φt, λf,t, bt, and µt. In the benchmark speciﬁcation we assume
that bt and µt are equal to zero and that the other four shocks follow AR(1) processes. We
use the method in Sims (2002) to solve the DSGE model.9 We collect all the DSGE model
parameters in the vector θ and stack the normalized innovations of the structural shocks in
the vector t.
4 Empirical Results
The goal of our empirical analysis is to study the eﬀects of changes in the coeﬃcients of
the monetary policy rule, θ(p), on the dynamics of the output gap, inﬂation, and nominal
interest rates. In addition to these three key macroeconomic variables we include the labor
share and hours worked in our estimation sample because these series can provide additional
information about the degree of price and wage rigidity. Our interest and inﬂation rates are
measured as annualized percentages. Within the model, e yt denotes the percentage deviation
of output from its trend path γ(t)y∗. We interpret the potential output series published
9The simpliﬁed model in Section 2 is obtained by setting α = 0, h = 0, νl = 0, ζw = 0, ρR = 0, 1/a0 = 0,
S00 = 0, γ = 0, kt = 0, bt = 0, µt = 0, φt = 0, λf,t = 0.23
by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) as a measure of γ(t)y∗. Hence, the output gap,
computed as log diﬀerence of real and potential GDP provides us with a measure of e yt.
We scale the output gap, labor share, and log hours worked by a factor of 100 to obtain
percentages. Further details about the data are provided in the Appendix. The empirical
results reported subsequently are based on a quarterly sample from 1982:Q4 to 2005:Q4.
Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) the beginning of the sample is chosen to exclude
the high inﬂation episode of the 1970s as well as Volcker’s disinﬂation.
The relationships between the deviations from steady state that appear in the model
description of Section 3 and the observables yt are given by the following measurement
equation:
y1,t = ra
∗ + 400γ + πa



















Here, we have partitioned yt such that y1,t corresponds to the policymaker’s instrument
(the interest rate), and y2,t is a vector that includes the remaining four observables. The
steady state (net) real interest rate in our model is given by ra
∗ + 400γ. The parameter ra
∗
is related to the discount rate β according to β = 1/(1 + ra
∗/400), and πa
∗ = 400π∗ denotes
steady state annualized inﬂation.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. As a benchmark we use the DSGE
model of Section 3 with four exogenous shocks that follow independent AR(1) processes
(technology zt, government spending gt, labor supply φt, mark-up λf,t) and the serially
uncorrelated monetary policy shock 1,t. First, we will present evidence of misspeciﬁcation
in the benchmark DSGE model by comparing its ﬁt to the ﬁt of a DSGE-VAR that relaxes
the DSGE model implied restrictions. Discrepancies in the dynamics of DSGE model and
DSGE-VAR are used to motivate generalizations of the shock structure in the theoretical
model. Overall, we will consider three alternative empirical models that are meant to
capture some of the misspeciﬁcation present in the benchmark DSGE model. These are:
(i) a DSGE-VAR with four lags that relaxes the cross-equation restrictions implied by the
rational expectations solution of the DSGE model; and two versions of the DSGE model in
which we generalize the exogenous shock structure prior to solving the model, namely, (ii)
a version in which the AR(1) government spending shock is replaced by an AR(2) process
(AR(2)-in-gt); (iii) a version that contains two additional AR(1) shocks: an investment-
speciﬁc technology shock µt and a shock to the discount factor bt (7-shocks).24
Second, we document how the treatment of misspeciﬁcation will aﬀect the estimation
of preference and technology parameters in the underlying DSGE model. In particular,
we compare the estimates obtained from the four empirical speciﬁcations and study how
diﬀerences in parameter estimates translate into diﬀerences in policy predictions with the un-
derlying DSGE model. Finally, we conduct the policy analysis using the benchmark DSGE
model, the AR(2)-in-gt and the 7-shocks DSGE models, and the DSGE-VAR (backward-
looking analysis, policy-invariant misspeciﬁcation, and acknowledge misspeciﬁcation). We
show that the policy implications of the DSGE model are by and large robust to the treat-
ment of misspeciﬁcation.
4.1 Assessing Misspeciﬁcation
The ﬁrst step in our empirical analysis is the speciﬁcation of a prior distribution for the
parameters of the DSGE model. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 contain prior means and stan-
dard deviations. The prior distribution for the policy parameters ψ1 and ψ2 is approximately
centered at Taylor’s (1993) values, whereas the smoothing parameter lies in the range from
0.18 to 0.83. The prior for the Calvo parameters ζp and ζw, which characterize the nominal
rigidities in prices and wages, respectively, are centered at 0.6 with a standard deviation of
0.15. This is a fairly diﬀuse distribution that encompasses ﬁndings in micro-level studies of
price adjustments such as Bils and Klenow (2004).10 The priors for the autocorrelation and
standard deviation of the shocks processes are chosen with two criteria in mind. First, we
want to be close to previous studies in the literature, such as Smets and Wouters (2003),
DSSW, and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005). Second, we want to make sure
that the second moments (especially volatility and autocorrelation) of the endogenous vari-
ables are roughly in line with the evidence from the pre-sample (1955:Q3 and 1982:Q3).
Further details about the prior are provided in the Technical Appendix.
We proceed by computing log marginal likelihood values for our four empirical model
speciﬁcations. The marginal likelihoods provide an overall measure of relative ﬁt that trades-
oﬀ in-sample ﬁt with model complexity. Log marginal likelihoods and posterior odds relative
to the DSGE-VAR (assuming that all four speciﬁcations receive equal prior probability)
10We have also estimated the same model under a prior for the Calvo parameters centered at the higher
value of 0.75, with standard deviation of 0.1. Interestingly, the ﬁt of the model under the two priors, one
largely agnostic and one that assumes a high degree of nominal rigidities, is roughly comparable. In the
interest of space we show only the results from the agnostic prior, which achieves slightly better ﬁt. But
most of the results are robust under the alternative prior view of the world.25
are reported in Table 2. The ﬁt of the DSGE-VAR crucially depends on the choice of
hyperparameter λ. For λ = ∞ we are dogmatically imposing all the restrictions of a
VAR(4) approximation of the DSGE model, whereas for λ = 0 these restrictions are ignored.
We have estimated the DSGE-VAR model for the grid of λ values {0.5,0.75,1,1.5,1,2,5}.
Consistent with the results in DSSW we ﬁnd that the marginal likelihood of the DSGE-VAR
as a function of λ has an inverted U-shape with a peak reached for λ = 0.75. The marginal
likelihood of the DSGE-VAR reported in Table 2 as well as all DSGE-VAR results presented
subsequently are therefore based on λ = 0.75.11 The log marginal likelihood diﬀerential
between the DSGE benchmark model and the DSGE-VAR is 109. We conclude that allowing
for deviations from the restricted moving average representation associated with the DSGE
benchmark DSGE model – we generically denoted these deviations by D∆
j in Equation (7)
– leads to a substantial improvement in the marginal likelihood. A generalization of the
shock structure also leads to better ﬁt: the marginal likelihood diﬀerentials relative to the
DSGE-VAR shrink to 79 (AR(2)-in-gt) and 64 (7-shocks), respectively.
To gain insights into the misspeciﬁcation of the DSGE model restrictions we examine
the moving-average representation generated by the DSGE-VAR. More speciﬁcally, we use
Equations (24) and (26) to compute DSGE-VAR impulse responses to technology, govern-
ment spending, mark-up, labor supply, and monetary policy shock innovations. For expo-
sition purposes we focus on those variables that are most important for the policy exercise:
the interest rate, inﬂation, and the output gap. The following impulse-response functions
are in principle of interest: the benchmark DSGE model, the VAR approximation of the
DSGE model, that is, DSGE-VAR(λ = ∞), and the DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75), which provides
the best ﬁt. A comparison of DSGE and DSGE-VAR(λ = ∞) documents the approximation
error induced by potential lack of invertibility and truncation of VAR lags (see Fernandez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007)). We ﬁnd that for our model and
identiﬁcation procedure the VAR approximation error is not a concern.12 Hence, we will fo-
cus on a comparison of impulse-responses obtained from the DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75) and the
DSGE-VAR(λ = ∞) using the posterior draws of the DSGE model parameters θ associated
with the estimated DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75). Figure 1 displays the posterior mean impulse
responses and illustrates the eﬀect of the misspeciﬁcation matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆ in (14).
11Instead of conditioning on the value of λ that maximizes the marginal likelihood function, we could
average all of our results with respect to the posterior probabilities of λ, which are proportional to the
marginal likelihood values. However, since the marginal likelihood function is sharply peaked and the model
predictions of interest tend to be smooth functions of λ, we believe that our simpliﬁcation does not distort
the empirical results.
12A Figure with the relevant impulse response function comparison is provided in the Technical Appendix.26
Consistent with results reported in DSSW we ﬁnd that the misspeciﬁcation of the propaga-
tion mechanism for the technology shock is fairly small. The propagation of mark-up and
labor supply shocks is also by and large not aﬀected by the discrepancy matrices. Most of
the misspeciﬁcation is concentrated in the response to government spending/demand shocks
(gt). The DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75) responses are hump-shaped and much more persistent than
the DSGE-VAR(λ = ∞)’s.
The DSGE-VAR analysis provides some justiﬁcation for the generalizations of the ex-
ogenous shock structure in the benchmark DSGE model that we are considering. Since it
is the response to a government spending shock that appears to be most severely misspeci-
ﬁed, we replace the AR(1) process for gt with an AR(2) process using the hierarchical prior
described in Section 4.4:
gt = ˜ ρg,1(1 − ˜ ρg,2)gt−1 + ˜ ρg,2gt−1 + ˜ σgt.
The parameterization of the AR(2) process in terms of partial autocorrelations ˜ ρg,1 and ˜ ρg,2
guarantees that the process is stationary for ˜ ρj ∈ (−1,1) (see Barndorﬀ-Nielson and Schou
(1973)). We shrink the coeﬃcients of this AR(2) process toward an AR(1) representation
with autocorrelation ξg and innovation variance ωg (see Table 1). Overall, our prior takes
the form p(˜ ρg,1, ˜ ρg,2, ˜ σg|ξg,ωg)p(ξg,ωg), where p(˜ ρg,1, ˜ ρg,2, ˜ σg|ξg,ωg) is given in (32) and we
set T∗ = 70.13 Figure 2 overlays the impulse responses for the AR(2)-in-gt DSGE model
(black lines) with those from the benchmark speciﬁcation (gray lines). A comparison with
Figure 1 indicates that the responses to a demand shock in the AR(2)-in-gt model are indeed
much closer to those of the DSGE-VAR than in the baseline speciﬁcation. The responses
of interest rates and the output gap are hump-shaped, whereas the response of inﬂation is
more persistent under than under the baseline speciﬁcation. The responses to the other
shocks, on the other hand, appear essentially unaﬀected and closely resemble those of the
benchmark DSGE model.
As an alternative to the DSGE model with AR(2) government spending shock we con-
sider a version of the model with investment-speciﬁc technology shocks and shocks to the
stochastic discount factor. Fisher (2006) documents that investment-speciﬁc technology
shocks are an important source of business cycle ﬂuctuations and Justiano and Primiceri
(2006) argue that a reduction in the volatility of this shock can account for much of the
great moderation observed since the mid 1980s. Numerous studies document that the asset
pricing implications of models as the one used in this paper are at odds with the data.
13We chose this value of T∗ as it implies roughly the same prior weight as in the DSGE-VAR.27
The shock bt exogenously modiﬁes the model implied stochastic discount factor and hence
can be viewed as a device that corrects misspeciﬁcation in the consumption Euler equation.
Figure 3 compares the impulse responses for this 7-shocks model (black lines) with those
from the baseline speciﬁcation (gray lines). The impulse responses to the two additional
shocks are quite persistent, as conﬁrmed by the estimates for the corresponding autocorrela-
tion parameters ρb and ρµ in Table 1. The additional shocks capture some of the dynamics
previously captured by demand shocks. In particular, the responses of interest rates and the
output gap to an investment-speciﬁc technology shock are hump-shaped, and the response
to inﬂation is quite persistent. These impulse responses very much resemble the DSGE-VAR
responses to a demand shock, much more so than the demand shock impulse responses in
the baseline model (at least in terms of the variables considered here). In other words, in-
troducing additional shocks captures some of the misspeciﬁcation present in the benchmark
speciﬁcation of the DSGE model.
4.2 Misspeciﬁcation and Parameter Estimates
We will now examine to what extent the estimates of the DSGE model parameters diﬀer
across the four empirical models. Posterior means and standard deviations are reported in
Table 1. We begin with the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy rule. The posterior means
of ψ1, the central bank’s reaction to inﬂation deviations from steady state range from 2.49
(AR(2)-in-gt DSGE) to 3.06 (7-shocks DSGE). Since the posterior standard deviations are
about 0.35, there is considerable overlap of the credible intervals associated with these
estimates. Posterior means of ψ2 range from 0.07 to 0.12 with standard deviations of
approximately 0.05, indicating a modest response of the Federal Reserve to output gap
movements. Finally, we ﬁnd a fairly high degree of interest rate smoothing, with posterior
mean estimates of ρR between 0.81 and 0.85. By and large, our policy rule estimates are in
line with the numbers reported in DSSW, who ﬁnd ˆ ψ1 = 2.21, ˆ ψ2 = 0.07, and ˆ ρR = 0.82.
The estimates in DSSW are based on a slightly larger sample, starting in 1974:Q2, a broader
set of observables that includes consumption and investment, and a diﬀerent measure of
output, namely real GDP growth rates. Finally, our estimates are also broadly consistent
with numbers reported in Smets and Wouters (2006) for the 1984:Q1 to 2004:Q4 sample,
who ﬁnd a somewhat smaller response to inﬂation: ˆ ψ1 = 1.77. We conclude that the policy
rule estimates are fairly insensitive to the adjustments that were made to the benchmark
DSGE model to account for misspeciﬁcation. Based on our estimates we use the values
ψ1 = 2.75, ψ2 = 0.062, and ρR = 0.8 as historical reference points in the evaluation of28
monetary policy rules.
Important for the eﬀects of monetary policy and the propagation of monetary policy
shocks are the parameters ζp and ζw, which determine the degree of nominal rigidity in
the DSGE model. For price stickiness the estimates range from 0.67 (7-shocks DSGE) to
0.76 (AR(2)-in-gt DSGE) with standard deviations of about 0.05 and considerable overlap
in the posterior densities. Interestingly, there is more divergence in the estimated wage
stickiness with posterior mean estimates between 0.34 (AR(2)-in-gt DSGE) and 0.77 (7-
shocks DSGE). As a reference point, we also provide estimates from DSSW: ˆ ζp = 0.83 and
ˆ ζw = 0.89; Smets and Wouters (2006, post 1983 sample): ˆ ζp = 0.73 and ˆ ζw = 0.74; Levin,
Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2006): ˆ ζp = 0.82 and ˆ ζw = 0.80. In general, the analysis
diﬀers with respect to sample period and speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve. Nevertheless,
the dispersion suggests that the estimates are quite sensitive to auxiliary assumptions.
As was apparent from the impulse response functions discussed in the previous subsec-
tion, the estimated exogenous processes are highly serially correlated. Technology shocks
are particularly persistent, with ρz tightly estimated around 0.97 in the three versions of
the DSGE model. To provide a comparison, Smets and Wouters (2006) estimate ρz to be
0.97 for the 1966:Q1 to 1979:Q2 sample, 0.94 for the post 1983 sample, and 0.95 for the
combined sample. Demand shocks appear to be strongly autocorrelated in the benchmark
DSGE model (ˆ ρg = 0.91) and in the AR(2)-in-gt model, for which the estimated ﬁrst-order
partial autocorrelation of gt is 0.97. Labor supply and mark-up shocks are less persistent
with estimates ranging from 0.66 to 0.8 and 0.3 to 0.75, respectively.
Interestingly, the persistence of technology shocks under the DSGE-VAR is only about
0.89 and the standard deviation of the innovation is 0.42 as opposed to 0.72 in the bench-
mark DSGE model. Under DSGE-VAR model misspeciﬁcation is partly captured by the
deviations Ψ∆ and Σ∆ from the cross-equation restrictions. This leads to smaller forecast
errors and ultimately to smaller shock volatility estimates. If the DSGE model restrictions
are not relaxed, then the misspeciﬁcation has to be absorbed by some of the structural
shocks, which may result in highly persistent and fairly volatile processes. For instance,
while in the 7-shock DSGE model the estimated autocorrelations for the government spend-
ing, the labor supply, and the mark-up shock are not as high as in the benchmark DSGE
model, the additional investment-speciﬁc technology shock and the discount factor shock
appear to be highly serially correlated: ˆ ρµ = 0.91 and ˆ ρb = 0.94.
In general, the posterior estimates for the non-policy parameters θ(np) obtained from
the DSGE-VAR lie between the prior and the benchmark DSGE posterior. This ﬁnding29
is consistent with Equation (19) and the theory presented in Section 2.1.2. For moderate
values of λ, indicating the presence of misspeciﬁcation, less weight is placed on the likelihood
function and more weight on the prior distribution when determining the posterior.
4.3 Policy Implications of Estimates
With the parameter estimates in hand, we will now explore how the volatility of the output
gap, inﬂation, and interest rates is aﬀected by changes in the coeﬃcients ψ1, ψ2, and ρR of
the monetary policy rule (33). In this subsection we will compute unconditional variances
with the benchmark DSGE model using (i) the estimates of the non-policy parameters θ(np)
obtained when ﬁtting the state-space representation of the benchmark DSGE models to the
data (columns 4 and 5 of Table 1), and (ii) the estimates of θ(np) obtained from the DSGE-
VAR analysis conditional on λ = 0.75 (columns 6 and 7 of Table 1). For brevity we will
refer to (i) as the direct DSGE model estimates and to (ii) as the DSGE-VAR estimates.
We consider a two-dimensional grid for the policy rule coeﬃcients: ψ1 takes nine values
ranging from 1.001 to 3 in intervals of 0.25; ψ2 takes six diﬀerent values, computed taking
the Taylor’s (1993) value ψT
2 = 0.125 as a reference, namely 0, 1
2ψT




2 = 0.188, 2ψT
2 = 0.250, 3ψT
2 = 0.375. We set the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient
ρR = 0.8. We will report variance diﬀerentials relative to the baseline policy rule ψ1 = 2.75,
ψ2 = 0.062, ρR = 0.8. These values are chosen based on the parameter estimates reported
in Section 4.2 and roughly correspond to the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy rule.
As in Section 2, we use V(θ(p),θs,Ψ∆,Σ∆) to generically denote the covariance matrix
of the output gap, inﬂation, and interest rates associate with an empirical model. Mainly
for expositional convenience we summarize the covariance matrix V(·) through the (loss)
function
min {tr[WV(θ(p),θs,Ψ∆,Σ∆)],B},
where the upper bound B ensures that the posterior expected value of the variance is well
deﬁned when averaging over θs, Ψ∆, and Σ∆, regardless of the shape of the posterior distri-
bution. The upper bound B is set to 100. This value is substantially larger than the sample
variances of the output gap, inﬂation, and interest rates, which are approximately 4.1, 1, and
6.5, respectively, in our estimation sample. The weighting matrix for this summary measure
is diagonal with entries 1/4 (annualized interest rates), 1 (annualized inﬂation rates), and
1/4 (output gap, percentage deviations from potential output). Since misspeciﬁcation is a
serious concern in our subsequent analysis, we decided not to use the expected utility of30
the representative household in the underlying DSGE model as a measure of policy perfor-
mance. While not welfare-based, our performance measure is of interest to many central
bankers, who are generally concerned with the stabilization of output and inﬂation ﬂuctua-
tions. Moreover, it is widely used for the comparison of policy rules across broad classes of
models (see for instance Taylor’s (1999) volume).
To understand how changes in the policy rule aﬀect the volatility of the output gap,
inﬂation, and interest rates it is instructive to explore how the propagation of the structural
shocks is altered. Using the benchmark DSGE model and its direct parameter estimates for
the non-policy parameters θ(np) we compute impulse response functions for three diﬀerent
values of the response to inﬂation in the policy rule, ψ1: 2.75, 2, and 1.25, while ﬁxing
ψ2 = 0.0625. Posterior mean responses are plotted in Figure 4. The lines’ darkness is
proportional to the magnitude of the response. Since the estimated ψ1 is approximately 2.75,
the dark impulse responses in Figure 4 are essentially identical to the posterior estimates
of the impulse responses for the DSGE model. The propagation of the technology shock is
most sensitive to changes in the central bank’s reaction to inﬂation. Since the estimated
autocorrelation of the technology shock is near unity, a decrease in ψ1 from 2.75 to 1.25
results in a large and prolonged response of inﬂation and the interest rate.
Figure 5 shows two surfaces summarizing the posterior expected diﬀerentials of the
weighted variances as a function of the responses to inﬂation (ψ1) and the output gap (ψ2).
The black surface is based on the direct estimates of the parameters θ(np) whereas the gray
surface is based on the DSGE-VAR estimates. For both surfaces the variance diﬀerentials
are computed from the state space representation of the benchmark DSGE model. The
loss diﬀerential shown by the black surface reﬂect the impulse responses in Figure 4: As ψ1
decreases from its historical value the variance of inﬂation and the interest rate increase. The
increase is ﬁrst gradual, but then quite dramatic as ψ1 approaches 1. Under the DSGE-VAR
posterior distribution (gray) the loss diﬀerential also rises as ψ1 declines, but the increase
is not nearly as stark.
The diﬀerence in the surfaces is due to one element of the θ(np) vector: the persistence
of the technology shock ρz. Recall from Section 4.2 that the direct estimate of ρz is 0.97,
whereas the DSGE-VAR estimate is 0.89. Indeed, if we recompute the loss surface for the
DSGE-VAR estimates subject to the restriction that ρz = 0.97 and σz = 0.72 the two loss
surfaces are almost identical. Hence, the diﬀerences in the remaining non-policy parameters
matter very little in explaining the diﬀerent shape of the loss diﬀerentials in Figure 5.
To understand how ρz aﬀects the volatility of output and inﬂation, it is instructive to31
consider the simpliﬁed version of the DSGE model introduced in Section 2. If we restrict
ψ1 = 1/β, it becomes straightforward to calculate impulse response functions for output
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The autocorrelation of the technology shock has two eﬀects. Since the impulse responses
decay at the rate ρh
z, the more persistent the technology shock, the longer it takes for
marginal costs, output, and inﬂation to revert back to their steady state levels. Second, ρz
aﬀects the magnitude of the fall in real marginal costs. For values of ψ2 > κ/β an increase
in ρz raises the initial response of real marginal costs to a technology shock. Since inﬂation
is given by the sum of discounted future marginal costs, its response is ampliﬁed. We see
this mechanism at work in Figure 5. For a ﬁxed value of ψ1 the loss increases much more
rapidly as a function of ψ2 under the benchmark DSGE model estimates (high ˆ ρz) than
under the DSGE-VAR parameter estimates (moderate ˆ ρz).
As the central bank increases its reaction to output gap movements, the response of e yt+h
is dampened. Since marginal costs in this simple model are given by the diﬀerence between
output and the technology shock, the volatility of marginal costs and inﬂation increases. For
many reasonable weight functions, the rise in inﬂation ﬂuctuations outweighs the reduction
in output volatility and the overall loss increases as a function of ψ2, which explains the
shape of loss surface in Figure 5. In short, a strong response to output is undesirable under
the DSGE model – more so if the technology shock is highly persistent.
The theoretical literature (e.g., Woodford (2003)) emphasizes that the central bank
should not respond to output but rather to deviations of output from the level that would
prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities. In the simple model of Section 2, this ﬂexible
price output is given by e y
(fp)
t = zt + gt and the ﬂexible price output gap equals marginal
costs. If we change the monetary policy rule (1) to
Rt = ψ1πt + ψ2mct + σR1,t,
we can show that in the simple model an increase in ψ2 leads to more stable marginal
costs and inﬂation. In our estimated DSGE model marginal costs correspond to the labor32
share, which we include as observable variable in the estimation. However, the ﬂexible price
output gap is not simply given by marginal costs. Moreover, once misspeciﬁcation of the
DSGE model is a concern, the concept of ﬂexible price output is not well deﬁned anymore.
We recomputed the loss surfaces depicted in Figure 5 under a policy rule in which the
central bank responds to the labor share instead of our measure of output. Since inﬂation
in the larger DSGE model is also the expected sum of discounted future marginal costs, a
stabilization of marginal costs leads to a reduction of inﬂation volatility. Thus, according
to the estimated DSGE model, a response to the labor share instead of output does neither
lead to a performance deterioration, nor does it generate any improvements over a policy
that strongly responds to inﬂation. This conclusion holds for both the DSGE model and
the DSGE-VAR based parameter estimates, as well as for the case where misspeciﬁcation
is taken into account.
4.4 Relaxing the Restrictions on the Exogenous Shocks
The policy analysis in Section 4.3 was based on the benchmark DSGE model and ignored
the model misspeciﬁcation documented in Section 4.2. Subsequently, we will incorporate
concern about model misspeciﬁcation into the policy analysis. We begin by studying the
policy implications for the two versions of the DSGE model with a generalized exogenous
shock structure.
It is common in the literature on policy analysis with DSGE models to assume that
the exogenous shocks are policy invariant. This assumption is plausible in so far the shocks
truly capture fundamental shifts in preferences and technologies. If, on the other hands,
the shocks partly capture model misspeciﬁcation, their policy-invariance is not self-evident.
In computing the subsequent results, we assume that the (generalized) shocks are indeed
policy invariant.
Figure 6 depicts the loss surfaces associated with the AR(2)-in-gt model (black) and the
7-shocks model (gray). To compute the policy performance measure we use the posterior
parameter distributions associated with the two models, summarized in columns (7,8) and
(9,10) of Table 1. Both loss functions have roughly the same shape as under the bench-
mark speciﬁcation: the loss increases quite rapidly as ψ1 decreases or ψ2 increases. Thus,
addressing the misspeciﬁcation in the benchmark model by relaxing the restrictions on the
process for the exogenous shocks results in empirical speciﬁcations that ﬁt the data better
but have qualitatively similar policy implications.33
The main reason for the similarity of the loss surfaces is that neither for the AR(2)-in-
gt nor for the 7-shocks speciﬁcation, the generalization of the shock structure signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the estimated persistence ρz of the technology shock. Under the benchmark DSGE
model ˆ ρz = 0.97, whereas for the two alternative speciﬁcations ˆ ρz = 0.96. As we argued in
Section 4.3, it is the persistence of the technology shock that drives the policy implications
of the DSGE model. One can interpret this ﬁnding as stating that the ‘true’ technology
process is indeed highly persistent or, alternatively, that this persistence is a symptom of
model misspeciﬁcation. In the latter case one should interpret the policy recommendations
from all three DSGE models (benchmark, AR(2)-in-gt, and 7-shocks) with caution.
4.5 Relaxing Restrictions on the VAR Representation
We now proceed by directly relaxing the restrictions that the benchmark DSGE model
imposes on the (approximate) vector autoregressive representation (9) for our observables.
To account for model misspeciﬁcation, the DSGE-VAR approach introduces discrepancy
matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆ into the law of motion (14). We established in Section 4.2 that a
deviation from the restriction functions Ψ∗(θ) and Σ∗(θ) improves the log marginal likelihood
by 109 points. To conduct policy analysis with the DSGE-VAR we have to make assumptions
about the post-intervention values of the discrepancy matrices and will in turn implement
the approaches discussed in Section 2.1.3.
Sims (1999) uses a structural VAR framework to study whether a modern interest-
rate feedback rule could have prevented the great depression. He estimates the VAR on
pre World War II data and replaces the actual policy rule by a hypothetical one. Similarly,
Rudebusch and Svenson (1999) ﬁt a small scale backward looking model to output, inﬂation,
and interest rate data and assess the performance of diﬀerent, hypothetical interest rate
feedback rules in the context of the estimated model. In the context of the DSGE-VAR
framework this backward-looking analysis amounts to treating the estimated empirical model
as a structural VAR and conducting policy analysis by changing the interest-rate feedback
rule under the assumption that the decision rules of the private sector remain unchanged
(see Equation (24)).
Again, the simple model of Section 2 can be used to shed light on the analysis. Suppose
that gt = 0, 1,t = 0, and all ﬂuctuations are due to the technology shock. Moreover, past
policy is given by ψ∗
1 = 1/β and ψ∗
2 = 0. According to (50), the conditional expectations
I Et[e yt+1] and I Et[πt+1] under the historical policy are given by ρze yt and ρzπt, respectively.34
If we plug the conditional expectations into (2) and (3) and quasi-diﬀerence (3) we obtain
the following backward-looking system
Rt − ψ1πt − ψ2e yt = 0 (51)
(1 − ρz)e yt − ρzπt + Rt = 0
−κe yt + (1 − βρz)πt = −ρzκe yt−1 + ρz(1 − βρz)πt−1 − κσzz,t,
which is a special case of our general representation (24). It is straightforward to show that
inﬂation and output evolve according to
πt = ρzπt−1 − κ
1 − ρz + ψ2
(1 − βρz)(1 − ρz + ψ2) + (ψ1β − ρzβ)κ/β
σzz,t (52)
e yt = −
ψ1 − ρz
1 − ρz + ψ2
πt.
If we keep ψ1 at the historical value 1/β, then (52) is identical to the rational expectations
solution for a wide range of values of ψ2 because the conditional expectations of output
and inﬂation are independent of ψ2. For other values of ψ1, we deduce from (52) that
the backward-looking system inherits a key feature of the rational expectations system: a
stronger response to inﬂation tends to reduce the volatility of inﬂation.
Our empirical analysis is of course more complex. The vector autoregressive law of
motion of the endogenous variables is altered by Ψ∆ and Σ∆ (see Equation (24)). The
backward-looking analysis is essentially based on two assumptions: (i) private agents’ ex-
pectations of future variables as functions of current and past observables are not aﬀected by
changes in the monetary policy rule; and (ii) the discrepancy matrices are policy invariant.
The expected loss diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 based on the backward-looking
analysis are shown in Figure 7 (dark surface). We also plot the loss-diﬀerential obtained un-
der the benchmark DSGE model (gray surface), using the posterior parameter estimates of
the DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75).14 In line with the implications of the simpliﬁed model (51), the
outcomes under the backward-looking analysis resemble the forward-looking analysis with
the benchmark DSGE model, at least qualitatively. Small values of ψ1 tend to generate
more volatility and strong responses to output tend to destabilize the economy. Quantita-
tively, the loss diﬀerentials are much larger for high values of ψ2. This is because the system
becomes explosive in that region, which is a common issue with backward looking analysis.
The backward-looking approach is appealing if the degree of DSGE model misspeciﬁ-
cation (captured by Ψ∆ and Σ∆) is so large that the DSGE model structure (captured by
14The gray surfaces in Figure 7 is identical to the gray surface in Figure 5.35
Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)) and Σ∗(θ(p),θ(np))) is unable to explain the dynamics in the data. In this
case, one might call into question information coming from the DSGE model, that is, how
the Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)) and Σ∗(θ(p),θ(np)) matrices change with policy, and decide to completely
ignore it in carrying out the policy analysis. Is the backward-looking approach justiﬁed in
the context of the estimated DSGE-VAR? Arguably, the answer is no. According to Fig-
ure 1 the DSGE model captures the dynamic responses to a technology shock quite well.
We have also shown that much of the shape of the loss surface is due to the contribution of
the technology shock to our weighted average of variances. Hence the rationale for ignoring
the impact of the policy parameters on Ψ∗(θ(p),θ(np)) and Σ∗(θ(p),θ(np)) is not very strong,
at least in those dimensions where the model ﬁts well. For this reason we consider two
alternative approaches for dealing with model misspeciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst approach – policy-invariant misspeciﬁcation – amounts to assuming that the
misspeciﬁcation matrices are invariant to the policy parameters. As described in (27), we
compute impulse response functions from the DSGE-VAR for λ = 0.75 and λ = ∞. These
impulse responses deliver us discrepancies IRF∆
j that capture deviations of the estimated
from the restricted moving average representation. The IRF∆
j ’s are displayed in Figure 1
as the discrepancies between the DSGE-VAR impulse responses for λ = 0.75 and λ = ∞. In
terms of the notation developed in Section 2.1 we will essentially let e D∗
j(θ(p),θ(np)) vary with
the policy parameters θ(p) and assume that the discrepancies IRF∆
j are policy invariant.
Hence, if according to the DSGE-VAR analysis the response to a particular shock, for
instance the technology shock, is well captured by the underlying DSGE model, then we
recover the policy prediction of the DSGE model. If the DSGE-VAR analysis implies that
the propagation of a particular shock is poorly captured by the DSGE model, e.g., the
demand shock, then our policy predictions are potentially diﬀerent from those of the DSGE
model.
The gray surface in Figure 8 shows the expected loss diﬀerential under the assumption
that moving-average discrepancies are policy invariant. One can readily see that these loss
diﬀerentials are almost identical to the DSGE model’s loss diﬀerentials, shown in Figure 7.





















While the last term aﬀects the overall variance, it does not alter variance diﬀerentials across
policies. Large values of IRF∆
j only matter if they interact with model-implied moving
average coeﬃcient matrices e D∗
j that are sensitive to changes in monetary policy. We deduce36
from Figures 1 and 4 that the discrepancies IRF∆
j are large for the demand shock, but
the response to the demand shock is according to the DSGE model not very sensitive to
changes in ψ1 and ψ2. Hence, overall the presence of misspeciﬁcation does not change the
policy implications under the assumption that the moving-average discrepancies IRF∆
j are
policy-invariant.
The second approach – acknowledge misspeciﬁcation – is closer to the robust control
literature in that the policy-maker refuses to estimate the misspeciﬁcation matrices using
past data. The data are only used to assess the overall magnitude of the discrepancies,
as our analysis is conditional on the value of λ that maximizes the marginal likelihood
function associated with the DSGE-VAR. The smaller the estimated λ, the more diﬀuse
the prior covariance matrix for Ψ∆ and Σ∆. We generate draws draws from the DSGE-
VAR based posterior distribution of θ(np) and the prior distribution of Ψ∆,Σ∆ conditional
on θ(np) and the counterfactual policy parameter ˜ θ(p) to compute expected values for our
performance measure. The dark surface in Figure 8 shows the expected loss diﬀerential. A
comparison with Figure 5 (gray surface) indicates that the shape of the loss surface under the
acknowledge-misspeciﬁcation analysis closely resembles the loss surface associated with the
benchmark DSGE model. The reason for this similarity is that under the prior distribution
the discrepancy matrices have essentially mean zero. However, the uncertainty surrounding
the outcomes is quite diﬀerent in the two cases, as we now proceed to show.
A robust control analysis can typically be represented as a Nash equilibrium between
a policy maker and an evil adversary who chooses model misspeciﬁcations to harm the
policy maker. Bayesian analysis, on the other hand emphasizes the calculation of expected
losses and place less weight on extreme forms of model misspeciﬁcation. So far, we have
essentially conducted policy analysis under the assumption of risk-neutrality. That is, we
focused on expected variance diﬀerentials, ignoring the uncertainty associated with these
diﬀerentials. Figure 9 presents pointwise 90% credible intervals (dotted) for the weighted
variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1. The solid gray and black lines correspond to the
expected values that have been depicted in Figure 8. While the mean diﬀerentials obtained
from the acknowledge misspeciﬁcation analysis are similar to those from the analysis that
ignores model misspeciﬁcation, the uncertainty is much larger in the former case. Hence, a
risk-averse policy maker has an additional rationale for avoiding a weak response to inﬂation.
She also has a much smaller incentive to increase the inﬂation response beyond the baseline
value of 2.75 because the expected gains in performance are outweighed by the uncertainty
once potential misspeciﬁcation is taken into account.37
5 Conclusion
The presence of misspeciﬁcation in DSGE models raises two challenges for policymakers.
The ﬁrst challenge is recovering the structural (non-policy) parameters. Direct estimation
of the DSGE model is generally conducted under the assumption that the DSGE is the
data generating process, e.g. that there are no serious misspeciﬁcation issues. When this
assumption is violated, the parameter estimates can be misleading. In the case considered
here, a key non-policy parameter is the persistence of technology shocks ρz. DSGE model
estimation delivers an estimate of ρz close to one. If we believe that technology shocks are in
reality extremely persistent, direct estimation of the DSGE model is ﬁne and we can proceed
with the policy analysis. If on the other hand we suspect that this estimate of ρz results
from misspeciﬁcation, we may be suspicious of the policy implications. These implications
are that if the reaction to inﬂation in the policy rule drops below 1.5, and at the same time
the reaction to the output gap rises much above the historical value, the outcomes in terms
of the volatility of inﬂation and the interest rate are simply disastrous.
DSGE-VAR provides the policymakers with an alternative set of estimates. Under
DSGE-VAR, the DSGE is treated as a reference model around which the more loosely pa-
rameterized VAR is centered. While the non-policy parameters are still estimated as to
minimize deviations from the cross-equation restrictions, the penalty attached to these de-
viations (λ) is not inﬁnity. As a consequence, the DSGE-VAR parameter estimates are
more inﬂuenced by the prior distribution than in the case of direct DSGE model estima-
tion. This is an advantage of the DSGE-VAR procedure to the extent that the underlying
prior distribution for the DSGE model parameters has been speciﬁed in a careful man-
ner, drawing information about key structural parameters from a larger set of observations
that are excluded from the likelihood function. Thus, in the presence of misspeciﬁcation
the determination of the structural parameters in the DSGE model to some extent resem-
bles parameterization strategies favored by the calibration literature, which emphasizes the
careful use of data sources that provide prima facie evidence on the model parameters.
A popular approach to DSGE model estimation in presence of misspeciﬁcation is to
relax the cross-equation restrictions by adding free parameters to the model. This can be
done by adding more shocks, or by enriching the dynamics of the existing shocks. We
pursue both approaches and ﬁnd that they indeed improve ﬁt. They do not however aﬀect
the estimates of ρz, that remain very close to 1. This could be seen as indirect evidence
that neither approach fully addresses the misspeciﬁcation issue. In any case, this estimate38
of ρz implies that the policy prescriptions remain very close to those of the DSGE model.
The second challenge is to address misspeciﬁcation in the policy analysis. If we are con-
ﬁdent that the DSGE model at hand, in spite of being misspeciﬁed, captures the relevant
policy trade-oﬀs (see for instance the example in Kocherlakota (2006)), then misspeciﬁ-
cation might not be a concern. If one option is to ignore misspeciﬁcation completely, an
alternative option is to ignore the cross-equation restrictions, and conduct policy analysis
with a backward-looking model. Our empirical analysis with the DSGE-VAR framework
casts some doubts on both extremes. On the one hand, we document that misspeciﬁcation
is present and likely aﬀects the key policy trade-oﬀs. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that in
dimensions that are important for policy analysis, such as the propagation of technology
shocks, the misspeciﬁcation does not seem to be a concern.
If we decide to explicitly model misspeciﬁcation, either in the structural (adding free
parameters) or in the vector autoregressive (DSGE-VAR) form, the key question is how mis-
speciﬁcation interacts with policy. The structural approach treats the additional free param-
eters as policy invariant. Our DSGE-VAR approach treats misspeciﬁcation matrices either
as policy invariant (policy-invariant misspeciﬁcation analysis) or uses a prior distribution
for the post-intervention misspeciﬁcation matrices that is centered at zero (acknowledge-
misspeciﬁcation analysis). The approaches considered in this paper capture diﬀerent atti-
tudes toward the Lucas critique. The structural approach makes sense only if the exogenous
dynamics are truly exogenous. The DSGE-VAR/policy-invariant misspeciﬁcation analysis
is appealing only if one believes that the discrepancy matrices capture adjustments to the
dynamics that are insensitive to policy interventions. The DSGE-VAR/acknowledge mis-
speciﬁcation approach is more agnostic, as it refuses to learn from past data about the
misspeciﬁcation matrices, but shares the view that these matrices are not something we can
model explicitly. To some extent, this view can be justiﬁed by the following argument: If we
knew how to change the model to address misspeciﬁcation, we should have done it already.
We have documented the challenges of performing policy analysis with a state-of-the-
art, albeit misspeciﬁed DSGE model and developed a framework that allows researchers and
policy makers to explore the sensitivity of policy predictions under a variety of assumptions
about the policy invariance of discrepancies between theory and data. Two lessons are
robust across all modes of policy analysis considered in this paper. First, deviating from
the baseline parameters of the feedback rule is unlikely to provide substantial improvements
over the estimated Volcker-Greenspan policy. Second, it appears undesirable to decrease
the response to inﬂation, or increasing the reaction to deviations of output from a long-run39
trend path.
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A Appendix
We obtain all other series from Haver Analytics (Haver mnemonics are in italics). The
nominal rate corresponds to the annualized eﬀective federal funds rate (FED), in percent.
Inﬂation is computed using quarter-to-quarter log-diﬀerences of the chained-price GDP de-
ﬂator (JGDP), scaled by 400 to obtain annualized percentages. The output gap is deﬁned
as the log diﬀerence of real GDP (nominal GDP divided by the chained-price deﬂator) and
the CBO’s real potential output (GDPPOTH). The log diﬀerences are scaled by 100 to con-
vert them to percentages. Our measure of hours worked is computed by taking total hours
worked reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which is at annual
frequency, and interpolating it using growth rates computed from hours of all persons in
the non-farm business sector (LXNFH). We divide hours worked by LN16N to convert them
into per capita terms. We then take the log of the series multiplied by 100 so that all ﬁgures
can be interpreted as percentage changes in hours worked. The labor share is computed by
dividing total compensation of employees (YCOMP) obtained from the NIPA by nominal
GDP. We then take the log of the labor share multiplied by 100.43
Table 1: Prior and Posterior Moments
Name Prior DSGE DSGE-VAR Generalized Shocks
Benchmark λ = 0.75 AR(2)-in-gt 7-Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Policy Rule Parameters
ψ1 1.56 ( 0.36) 2.71 ( 0.35) 2.75 ( 0.37) 2.49 ( 0.44) 3.06 ( 0.35)
ψ2 0.20 ( 0.10) 0.09 ( 0.04) 0.13 ( 0.05) 0.12 ( 0.07) 0.07 ( 0.03)
ρr 0.50 ( 0.20) 0.81 ( 0.02) 0.85 ( 0.02) 0.84 ( 0.02) 0.85 ( 0.02)
Nominal Rigidities
ζp 0.60 ( 0.15) 0.76 ( 0.04) 0.71 ( 0.05) 0.77 ( 0.05) 0.67 ( 0.04)
ζw 0.60 ( 0.15) 0.40 ( 0.14) 0.45 ( 0.09) 0.77 ( 0.08) 0.34 ( 0.08)
Preference Parameters
h 0.70 ( 0.05) 0.80 ( 0.04) 0.72 ( 0.05) 0.66 ( 0.06) 0.62 ( 0.05)
νl 2.00 ( 0.75) 1.29 ( 0.48) 1.82 ( 0.61) 2.05 ( 0.72) 1.37 ( 0.37)
Technology Parameters
α 0.35 ( 0.05) 0.34 ( 0.00) 0.34 ( 0.01) 0.34 ( 0.00) 0.34 ( 0.00)
S00 4.00 ( 1.50) 11.19 ( 2.23) 5.04 ( 1.59) 7.31 ( 2.11) 2.69 ( 0.83)
a0 0.30 ( 0.08) 0.28 ( 0.08) 0.30 ( 0.07) 0.30 ( 0.07) 0.30 ( 0.08)
Steady State Parameters
ra
∗ 1.00 ( 0.40) 1.23 ( 0.28) 0.99 ( 0.35) 1.16 ( 0.32) 0.85 ( 0.30)
πa
∗ 4.01 ( 2.00) 2.63 ( 0.18) 2.51 ( 0.27) 2.58 ( 0.27) 2.43 ( 0.25)
g∗ 0.25 ( 0.10) 0.19 ( 0.08) 0.22 ( 0.09) 0.19 ( 0.08) 0.28 ( 0.11)44
Table 1: Prior and Posterior Moments (continued)
Name Prior DSGE DSGE-VAR Generalized Shocks
Benchmark λ = 0.75 gt-in-AR(2) 7-Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Shock Autocorrelations
ρz 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.97 ( 0.02) 0.89 ( 0.05) 0.96 ( 0.03) 0.96 ( 0.02)
ρg 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.91 ( 0.02) 0.88 ( 0.05) 0.84 ( 0.08)
˜ ρg,1 (implicit) 0.97 ( 0.01)
˜ ρg,2 (implicit) -0.62 ( 0.06)
ρλf 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.72 ( 0.07) 0.66 ( 0.11) 0.78 ( 0.07) 0.80 ( 0.06)
ρφ 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.58 ( 0.10) 0.30 ( 0.14) 0.53 ( 0.16)
ρµ 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.91 ( 0.03)
ρb 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.94 ( 0.04)
Shock Standard Deviations
σR 0.25 ( 0.13) 0.16 ( 0.01) 0.12 ( 0.01) 0.15 ( 0.01) 0.16 ( 0.01)
σz 0.38 ( 0.20) 0.72 ( 0.05) 0.42 ( 0.05) 0.75 ( 0.06) 0.79 ( 0.06)
σg 0.63 ( 0.32) 0.65 ( 0.06) 0.32 ( 0.04) 0.29 ( 0.04)
˜ σg (implicit) 0.77 ( 0.11)
σλf 0.19 ( 0.10) 0.09 ( 0.01) 0.09 ( 0.01) 0.08 ( 0.01) 0.10 ( 0.01)
σφ 3.76 ( 1.97) 3.11 ( 1.72) 3.16 ( 1.14) 19.90 ( 7.66) 2.45 ( 0.58)
σµ 0.95 ( 0.57) 0.53 ( 0.11)
σb 0.95 ( 0.57) 0.56 ( 0.11)
Hyperparameters for AR(2) Shocks
ξg 0.75 ( 0.10) 0.90 ( 0.04)
ωg 0.63 ( 0.32) 0.63 ( 0.09)
Notes: We report means and standard deviations (in parentheses). The parameters ρb,
ρµ, σb, and σµ only enter the DSGE model with 7-shocks. The DSGE model with AR(2)
government spending shocks is parameterized as gt = ˜ ρg,1(1 − ˜ ρg,2)gt−1 + ˜ ρg,2gt−1 + ˜ σgt
and we use a hierarchical prior of the form: p(˜ ρg,1, ˜ ρg,2, ˜ σg|ξg,ωg)p(ξg,ωg). In the table we
report p(ξg,ωg). The following parameters were ﬁxed: δ = 0.025, γ = 1.5/400, λf = 0.15,
and λw = 0.3.45
Table 2: Log Marginal Data Densities and Posterior Odds
Speciﬁcation lnp(Y ) Post Odds
DSGE Model, Benchmark Speciﬁcation -525.22 4.6E-48
DSGE-VAR (λ = ˆ λ = 0.75) -416.23 1.00
DSGE Model, Generalized Shocks: AR(2)-in-gt -495.66 3.2E-35
DSGE Model, Generalized Shocks: 7-shocks -479.92 2.2E-28
Notes: The diﬀerence of log marginal data densities can be interpreted as log posterior
odds under the assumption of that the two speciﬁcations have equal prior probabilities. We
report odds relative to the DSGE-VAR in the third column of the table.46












































































Notes: The ﬁgure depicts impulse responses from the DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75) (black) and the
DSGE-VAR(∞) (gray) based on the DSGE-VAR(λ = 0.75) posterior estimates summarized
in columns (5,6) of Table 1.47















































































Notes: The ﬁgure depicts impulse responses from the benchmark DSGE model (gray)
and the AR(2)-in-gt model (black) using the respective posterior estimates summarized
in columns (3,4) and (7,8) of Table 1.48
















































































































Notes: The ﬁgure depicts impulse responses from the benchmark DSGE model (gray) and
the 7-shocks model (black) using the respective posterior estimates summarized in columns
(3,4) and (7,8) of Table 1.49

















































































Notes: The ﬁgure plots the posterior mean of the DSGE model impulse responses computed
for three diﬀerent values of the response to inﬂation in the policy rule, ψ1: 2.75 (black), 2
(dark gray), and 1.25 (light gray). The remaining policy parameters ψ2 and ρR are kept
at the baseline values of 0.0625 and 0.8, respectively. For all impulse responses we use
the posterior estimates of the non-policy parameters θ(np), summarized in columns (3,4) of
Table 1.50
Figure 5: Comparative Performance of Policy Rules: Benchmark DSGE versus























Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 relative to baseline
policy rule ψ1 = 2.75, ψ2 = 0.0625. The remaining policy parameter ρR is kept at the
baseline value of 0.8. Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance reduction relative to baseline
rule. Diﬀerentials are computed using DSGE-VAR posterior (gray) and DSGE model (black)
posterior estimates of the non-policy parameters θ(np), summarized in columns (3,4) and
(5,6) of Table 1.51
























Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 relative to baseline
policy rule ψ1 = 2.75, ψ2 = 0.0625. The remaining policy parameter ρR is kept at the
baseline value of 0.8. Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance reduction relative to baseline
rule. Diﬀerentials are computed for the AR(2)-in-gt (black) and 7-shocks (gray) model using
the respective posterior estimates, summarized in columns (7,8) and (9,10) of Table 1.52
























Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 relative to baseline
policy rule ψ1 = 2.75, ψ2 = 0.0625. The remaining policy parameter ρR is kept at the
historical values of 0.8. Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance reduction relative to baseline
rule. Diﬀerentials are computed under the DSGE-VAR/Backward-Looking analysis (black)
and the DSGE model (gray). For the latter we use the DSGE-VAR posterior estimates of
the non-policy parameters θ(np), summarized in columns (5,6) of Table 1.53
Figure 8: Comparative Performance of Policy Rules: DSGE-
























Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 relative to base-
line policy rule ψ1 = 2.75, ψ2 = 0.0625. The remaining policy parameter ρR is kept at the
historical values of 0.8. Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance reduction relative to base-
line rule. Diﬀerentials are computed under the DSGE-VAR/Acknowledge Misspeciﬁcation
(black) and DSGE-VAR/Policy-Invariant Misspeciﬁcation (gray) analysis.54
Figure 9: Performance Uncertainty: Benchmark DSGE versus DSGE-
VAR/Acknowledge Misspecification Analysis













Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 relative to baseline policy
rule ψ1 = 2.75. The remaining policy parameters ψ2 and ρR are kept at their historical val-
ues of .0625 and .8, respectively. Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance reduction relative
to baseline rule. Diﬀerentials are computed under the DSGE-VAR/Acknowledge Misspeciﬁ-
cation approach (black) and the DSGE model (gray). For the latter we use the DSGE-VAR
posterior estimates of the non-policy parameters θnp. Dash-and-dotted lines represent 90%
posterior bands.